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 The unatic's Fancy and t he
 Work of Art
 Shelly Eversley
 It was as though I had entered a haunted wood wherein every detail
 of scene, each thought and incipient action, sprang together and
 became endowed with a surreal and sinister significance. Almost
 everything about me seemed bent upon contributing to my growing
 sense of the irrational disorder of life ...
 Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man
 Yes, sane men did misread reality. Just as he had once had fanta-
 sies, so now he was looking at men who were passionately arguing
 their own fantasies, trying to decide which fantasy was to be taken
 for reality.
 Richard Wright, The Outsider
 When the Lafargue Psychiatric Clinic opened in Harlem in
 1946, one newspaper responded with a headline, "They're Crazy
 Anyway." The clinic was the first of its kind; it offered counseling
 to poor people, mostly black, but regardless of race or ability to
 pay. According to Richard Wright, whose essay "Phychiatry [sic]
 Comes to Harlem" (1946) was specifically meant to increase the
 clinic's publicity and financial support, it "is the extension of the
 very concept of psychiatry into a new realm, the application of
 psychiatry to the masses, the turning of Freud upside down." In
 its practice the clinic rejected abstract notions of psychoanalytic
 neurosis to address what became understood as social and arti-
 ficially induced crises: "Negroes temporarily swamped by the Jim
 Crow conditions of Harlem ... the powerful personality con-
 flicts engendered in Negroes by the constant sabotage of their
 democratic aspirations . .. which easily tips the emotional scales
 toward neurosis" (49-50). It appeared underground (literally, in
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 the basement of a church) and without institutional recognition
 or financial support.' According to its well-known founder and
 director, psychiatrist Dr. Frederic Wertham, the clinic sought to
 treat patients whose "mental difficulties" arose out of the "free-
 floating hostility" that emerged from poverty, from congested liv-
 ing conditions, and, most importantly, from segregation (Ben-
 diner 23).2 Wertham, other volunteer psychiatrists, and mental
 hygiene professionals who donated their time, specifically at-
 tempted to address what they understood as the interior and in-
 tangible effects of racial discrimination-a problem Ralph El-
 lison describes as "the sickness of the social order." In an article
 written to support the clinic, Ellison contends that black people
 had become "confused" by a paradox: the reality of racist social
 inequality in the US and the nation's postwar reputation as cham-
 pion of democracy had exposed the "psychological character"
 of "the Negro's perpetual alienation in the land of his birth"
 ("Harlem" 295, 302). The paradox had threatened the recogni-
 tion of black American humanity and had implicated the integ-
 rity of democracy in the US. Thus, both Ellison and Wright
 applauded the emergence of the Lafargue Clinic-they helped
 Wertham secure the space, the clients, and the funds for its open-
 ing.3 And, rather than offering "proof" that, in fact, black people
 were "crazy anyway," the clinic presented a psychological dis-
 course to enunciate the implications and the new contours of
 what had been called the "Negro Problem," the "problem at the
 heart of every American" (4), in the words of Gunnar Myrdal's
 An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democ-
 racy (1944), as the nation began to imagine integration.
 As a significant but largely forgotten underground insti-
 tution, the Lafargue Clinic indeed represents the material em-
 bodiment of an emerging era-one that understood the crucial
 difference between "black" and "white" as moving beneath the
 surface and turning inward.4 By midcentury, increasing national
 and international demands for an exemplary democracy required
 a reconfiguration of US racial ideology, and rather than a ques-
 tion of color, of visible and public difference, this new "Negro
 Problem" became one of psychology and feeling, forcing the
 terms of race and the social and ethical implications of racial
 distinction out of sight. Concerning psychoanalysis, Wertham
 believed "a psychiatrist had to understand a patient's economic
 and community life," and he advanced an idea that "psychoanal-
 ysis and psychotherapy are not the property of the rich." He
 called his approach to psychoanalysis "social psychiatry" and
 argued "the real truth about an individual is always social"
 (Martin 798). Because "man is a social creature," Wertham wrote
 By mideentury,
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 of US racial ideology,
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 in the New Republic, "the connection between individual devel-
 opment and social causation must be the test of the value of
 any psychology" (129). As a result, the Lafargue Clinic had the
 potential to demonstrate through psychological discourses the
 social implications of the contradictory persistence of racism at
 midcentury. It addressed its patients' symptomology not as "lu-
 nacy" but as reasonable psychic responses to the lunatic obses-
 sions of US white supremacist culture, and its practice informed
 the narrative focus and strategy Wright and Ellison adopted in
 their postwar fictions. In a 1945 essay for the New Republic, writ-
 ten while he worked to establish the clinic, Ellison described the
 US as "a nation of ethical schizophrenics": "The unwillingness
 to resolve the conflict in keeping with his democratic ideals has
 compelled the white American, figuratively, to force the Negro
 down into the deeper level of his consciousness, into the inner
 world, where reason and madness mingle with hope and memory
 and endlessly give birth to nightmare and dream; down into the
 province of the psychiatrist and the artist, from whence spring
 the lunatic's fancy and the work of art" ("Beating" 99-100). Im-
 plicit in his statement is a striking equation that the unresolved
 tension between segregation and democracy inadvertently pro-
 duces a new alliance-between psychiatry and art-which I
 want to argue defines the most important black literary produc-
 tion of the late 1940s into the 1950s. The Lafargue Clinic contin-
 ued to operate until 1959; its years of operation coincide with
 a moment in American literature in which the artist self-
 consciously engages psychiatry.5 At this moment, Ellison's and
 Wright's work enact a historical turn toward psychology particu-
 larly as it enunciates the emerging contours of a "schizophrenic"
 American democracy and American literature.
 The literary engagement with social relations, their moral
 implications and their corresponding psychological manifesta-
 tions, represents a conscious risk, one that emphasizes the willful
 desire for full humanity at a transitional moment when deracia-
 lized public space and "universal" literature seems within reach.6
 Like most African-American authors before them, Ellison and
 Wright participate in a long-standing, traditional commitment
 to the equation between black literature and black humanity, but
 here their deliberate portrayals of individual mental processes for
 the first time imagine a freedom from what Claudia Tate has re-
 cently called "racial protocol." She argues that the conventions
 that define black writing privilege visible instances of racial pro-
 test and a public, collective identity while they suppress represen-
 tations of private, individual desire. Her psychoanalytic reading
 of black novels describes pervasive "unconscious desires that not
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 only refuse to remain subordinate to the intentional story but
 also unsettle the sanctioned social plot of identity" (12). But,
 unlike Tate's notion of an unresolved tension between public
 racial identity and unconscious private desire, Ellison's and
 Wright's commitment to the interaction between psychology and
 literature seeks to resolve the conflict between public and private,
 the race and the individual, the particular and the universal.
 Also, as a conscious move, they claim an agency the unconscious
 denies-"the turning of Freud upside down." The narrative
 choices in Ellison's "King of the Bingo Game" (1944) and In-
 visible Man (1952) and in Wright's Rite of Passage (1944) re-
 flect the authors' emerging interests in psychology, conversations
 with Wertham, and specifically, their plans to establish the clinic.
 Like Wright's The Outsider (1953), these postwar fictions risk
 exposing a "neurosis" not in the black writer, but in the reader.
 The reader becomes not a voyeur safely distant and untouched
 from the scene, but a participant whose behavior reveals a more
 dangerous "sickness." This notion of conscious risk deploys a
 critique of neurosis that is understood abstractly and ahistor-
 ically. It challenges the Freudian psychoanalytic emphasis on the
 primary nurturing environment while it also turns a critical eye
 toward an emerging social psychology and social psychiatry and
 their interest in external conditions-racialist culture and de-
 mocracy. Thus for Ellison and Wright, American culture and
 American democracy stand to lose if black people are "crazy
 anyway.? Within the risk on which their engagement with art and
 psychiatry stands, African Americans are not crazy, they just ap-
 pear that way. Once past the superficialities of color and once
 inside the "inner world" of psychology, the problematic culture,
 not a people, can be exposed and then "cured."
 Ellison employs the language of repression to illustrate the
 "schizophrenia" of the political order. Whites are "unwilling to
 resolve the conflict" of segregation and democracy, he argues,
 and in their repression, they "force the Negro down into deeper
 levels of his consciousness." Consequently, "the Negro problem"
 is not Negro at all. Rather, a "heart-lashing sea of irrationality,"
 perpetuated by whites, causes the problem that results in "a
 nightmarishly 'absurd' situation" for whites and for segregated
 black people ("Beating" 96). In "Harlem Is Nowhere" (1948) El-
 lison celebrates the Lafargue Clinic because it "represents an
 underground extension of democracy" by seeking to dissolve in-
 vidious racial difference and segregation (295). In its nondiscrim-
 inatory approach to mental health, the clinic offers a constructive
 solution to the "unreality," metaphorized as ethical schizophre-
 nia, that is the inequality forced daily upon its patients. Concern-
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 ing segregation, he writes, "when Negroes are barred from par-
 ticipating in the main institutional life of society they lose far
 more than economic privileges.... They lose one of the bul-
 warks which men place between themselves and the constant
 threat of chaos." For Ellison, the denial of this "bulwark" of in-
 stitutional life renders the Negro individual "nowhere," figura-
 tively out of sight and beneath social significance. Ultimately,
 this denial, or "invisibility," "leaves the most balanced Negro
 open to anxiety," feeling that she or he has "no stable, recognized
 place in society" (298-300). Notably, that placelessness antici-
 pates pervasive literary characterizations of social psychology by
 African-American authors that begin to emerge in the 1940s and
 climax in the 1950s.
 In their support for segregation and in their repression of
 the fundamental contradiction within their democratic prin-
 ciples, white Americans, according to Ellison, impose interpreta-
 tions of Negro experience that not only are false, but also
 amount to a denial of black humanity. The result is "an argu-
 ment in progress between black men and white men as to the
 true nature of American reality." Although the conflict he de-
 scribes seems psychological, the issue amounts to an ethical
 struggle between discrimination and equality-a political and
 philosophical debate of the "Negro Problem" that interrogates
 the possibilities for achieving an actual democratic social life.
 The language of psychology identifies and describes the crucial
 representational conflict between inauthentic and authentic "re-
 ality"; and, similarly, the Lafargue Clinic offers a "scientific will-
 ingness to dispense with preconceived notions and accept the
 realities of Negro, i.e., American life" ("Harlem" 301). In his es-
 say on the clinic, Wright engages both its concrete and its philo-
 sophical resonance. But first he insists, it "does exist," despite "a
 widely prevalent feeling among many people that it does not ex-
 ist" ("Psychiatry" 51). The New York State Department of Social
 Welfare initially refused the clinic's licensing and funding re-
 quests and decided, "there's no need for a psychiatric clinic in
 Harlem." At the same time, it sent patients to it for care. Without
 institutional recognition and legitimation, Lafargue, like its pa-
 tients, existed within contradiction. Many believed the clinic did
 not exist. Notably, this disbelief parallels what practitioners from
 the clinic characterize as "the powerful personality cofxflicts en-
 gendered in Negroes by the consistent sabotage of their demo-
 cratic aspirations ... which easily tips the normal emotional
 scales toward neurosis." For the psychiatric professionals at La-
 fargue the false promise of universal democracy affects how
 black people feel; it illustrates the "intangible truths" of segre-
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 gated, American social life. And, rather than agree to the "unre-
 ality" of the clinic, or submit to a simple verification of black
 racial "insanity," Wright, like Ellison, seeks a confrontation with
 contradiction, with what he calls "idealism protecting corrup-
 tion." Thus, in "reality" black people are not crazy; their "neuro-
 sis" is the "artificially-made psychological problems of Harlem,"
 of racial and economic caste, which, in Wright's words, have been
 forced sub rosa ("Psychiatry" 49-50).
 In a novella originally titled The Jackal, Wright explores
 the psychic desolation of living within Ellison's "nowhere." The
 feeling of having no place in the social world defines Wright's 15-
 year-old protagonist, Johnny Gibbs: "For the first time in his life
 his sensibilities met the naked reality of the world without an
 intermediary and his heart pounded" (Rite 29). Having lost what
 Ellison describes as "the bulwarks which men place between
 themselves and the constant threat of chaos," Johnny's heart
 forces him to seek refuge and belonging sub rosa, first by meeting
 a group of boys in the school basement under the cover of night,
 and then by joining a gang and entering the black criminal un-
 derworld. And, unlike the naturalism and social protest that pri-
 marily characterize his Native Son (1940), The Jackal (posthu-
 mously published as Rite of Passage) explores the psychology of
 race and alienation. Wright began the novella in 1944 as he com-
 pleted the final chapters of Black Boy (1945) and as he worked to
 establish the Lafargue Clinic. Wright's biographer Michel Fabre
 describes the author's intentions: "[H]e wanted to expose the psy-
 chology of a nascent criminal, not write a sociological study of
 juvenile delinquency." Wright's project also intersects with his
 stated desire to launch a magazine on crime "which presents so
 many affinities with art in psychological terms." The magazine
 would supply authors with outlines for stories and its editorial
 board of specialists would suggest the "true psychiatric" expla-
 nations of murder (Unfinished 503). In his journal Wright de-
 scribes several discussions of his work-in-progress with his friend
 Wertham and with a black social psychiatric caseworker from
 New York's Wiltwyck School for Boys. Through this caseworker,
 he was able to visit schools, courts, and other institutions con-
 cerned with juvenile delinquency and collect information for his
 new project. Because of his association with the caseworker,
 Wright himself admits, "I think I'll have the seeds for a damn
 good psychological study," and declares that the story's drama is
 "primarily emotional" (Rampersad 35). Rather than seeking to
 write a naturalistic novel, Wright sought, says Fabre, "to help
 juvenile delinquents and combat nervous disorders in the ghetto"
 (Unfinished 272-73). Rite of Passage thus represents an impor-
 American Literary History 451
 tant turning point in Wright's career. In 1945, in a gesture that
 formally marks his departure from naturalism and from commu-
 nism, he anticipates his definitive project as one that will describe
 "a spiritual journey ... not a material one" (Journal 1945). In
 celebration of Marcel Proust's Remembrance of Things Past
 (1919), Wright commends the author for his knowledge of the
 "latest developments in art and science," for his sensitivity to
 psychoanalytic themes, and for his ability to make them his own.
 He writes, "I must find something likewise to hang my theme of
 Negro life upon" (Journal 1945).
 Notably, Wright retitled The Jackal as Rite of Passage, in a
 move that illustrates a shift away from moral concerns toward
 the notion of a critical turning point in an individual's life. The
 narrative describes the moment when the state unfeelingly causes
 Johnny, a Negro, to lose his sense of security, family, and belong-
 ing in the world. The boy discovers that his parents and siblings
 are not his own, that he is a foster child, and for no apparent
 reason the city has decided to place him with another family. He
 discovers the corruption that lies beneath the surface and the
 information is a shock: "only a half hour ago his world had been
 so solid, real; now he lived in a hot, sick dream" (16). Once an
 outstanding student and citizen ("As in every subject. Peaches
 and cream.... The world was rosy and he was happy" [3]), John-
 ny's trauma sends him into "unreality" and toward social dys-
 function. The "nowhere" in which he finds himself literally and
 figuratively relegates him beneath the surface, a condition and a
 location Wright's new title suggests is of customary, ceremonial
 significance. Here, the individual story becomes general and in-
 dicative of a larger crisis. An impersonal, governmental system
 had dismissed Johnny's humanity, and, like segregation amid cel-
 ebrations of democracy, the illogic directs the boy's life and
 changes him. Indifference and hypocrisy produce another iden-
 tity: "Then he was still for a long time, filled with a strange sense
 of void; yet, there was rising up in him, out of a debacle of his
 former feelings, a new self and, when he became aware of that
 self, it was already firmly lodged in his mind and heart" (57).
 Johnny's new, dreamlike condition alters his sensibilities so that
 the boy becomes a new man whose subjectivity emerges inwardly
 from within "his mind and heart" rather than being forged in
 outward behavior. As the narrative suggests, the shock of rejec-
 tion alters him even before he consciously acknowledges it. And,
 despite the interior self that surfaces to meet the outward individ-
 ual, Rite of Passage directs the reader to the arbitrary causes of
 the protagonist's transformation, "you see, the City folks came
 and told me that you had to leave us. They didn't say why" (16).
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 The state needs no reason to impose itself on the life and destiny
 of the black boy whose story anticipates The Outsider as the
 culmination of Wright's research and literary ambition. Rather,
 in this narrative irrational and institutionalized power breeds a
 new person.
 Without ethical or practical justification for removing
 Johnny from his home, the city reveals itself as a symbol of the
 hostile institutions and social environment that order the young
 man's life. The teenage protagonist in Wright's novella must con-
 front by necessity what Arnold Rampersad calls "the power and
 carelessness of the white world" and begin living conscious of
 his alienation (121). Although Rampersad contends, "the age of
 fifteen is probably rather late for so dramatic a change in an indi-
 vidual's psychology" (124), Wright acutely understood the social
 and scientific resonance of creating a character whose interior-
 ity radically changes during adolescence. A consequence of this
 change is the psychological tension between perceptions of
 "real" and "unreal" evident not only in Rite of Passage but also
 in Wright's concurrent commitment to the Lafargue Clinic.
 Johnny's actual and psychic condition implicitly invokes the con-
 troversy surrounding the clinic and also the figurative schizo-
 phrenia Ellison uses to describe the condition in which the imagi-
 nary approximates the actual and that for him defines the US:
 "[H]is mother's and sister's solid presence seemed unreal ... this
 was real, was no dream" (13). Moreover, Johnny is at the age in
 which the initial symptoms of clinical schizophrenia emerge. This
 coincidence is deliberate. According to Wright, "the Negro is
 America's metaphor" (White Man 74), and Rite of Passage seeks
 to make the metaphor literal as it self-consciously attempts to
 describe the culture of neurosis.
 Schizophrenia, notes Otto Fenichel, is "any group of psy-
 chotic reactions characterized by withdrawal from reality with
 highly variable affective, behavioral and intellectual distur-
 bances," and its symptoms consist of "disturbances of associa-
 tion and affectivity, the predilection for fantasy as against reality,
 and the inclination to divorce oneself from reality" (432).7 Wright
 depicts Johnny's situation as schizophrenic-what he believes to
 be real is not, and his reality feels like a dream. Similarly, the loss
 of his family critically prompts associative disturbances. Once he
 learns the woman who raised him is not his actual mother, he
 seeks the truth and he finds madness. His friend Billy tells him
 about his "real" mother: "They said she had demon ... demon
 something. I can't remember. There was another word. Sounded
 like tea or something. Oh, yes. They said it was demon preco or
 something like that.... [W"hen you got it, it seems like you don't
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 know what you're doing when you're doing something. Like
 crazy folks act, see? . . . [I]t seems that they put your mother in
 a ... put her away. You know. In one of those asylums'" When
 Johnny learns that his mother "was awfully sick," he "felt mad-
 dened" (48-49). Her institutionalization adds another dimension
 to Johnny's story and to Wright's metaphor. Both mother and
 son are "nowhere"; her disorientation precedes his dislocation.
 Moreover, Billy mispronounces her "sickness"-demon preco is
 demence precoce, "early deterioration of the mind," later trans-
 lated into Latin, dementia praecox, by German psychiatrist Emil
 Kraeplin. Now known as schizophrenia, the term for his moth-
 er's illness describes her alienation from "reality." And, since the
 novella offers no evidence of the mother's actual psychosis, her
 "deterioration" recalls Wright's characterization of an artificial
 neurosis as it figuratively articulates the boy's rite of passage: "He
 was nothing, a nobody; he felt he had no claim upon anybody in
 the world" (52). Like his mother before him, and like all Negroes
 conscious of the contradiction that defines their existence in a
 segregated US, Johnny's self-awareness is the negation that expo-
 ses contradiction.
 Like Rite of Passage, Ellison's "King of the Bingo Game,"
 also published in 1944-the year he met Wertham-emphasizes
 the problem of perception and self-conception that anticipates a
 literary phenomenology both writers sought to develop. In El-
 lison's story, misperception characterizes the protagonist's dislo-
 cation from reality while it also exposes a hypocritical truth
 about the world. A nameless protagonist falsely imagines he pos-
 sesses agency; the man believes he can control a spinning bingo
 wheel and resolve the psychic and economic burden of his every-
 day life. Unemployed, Ellison's character has no means to pay
 the doctor needed to attend his gravely ill wife. Since he believes
 the $36.90 jackpot will ameliorate his dilemma, he approaches the
 game with a scientific determination. Before the game begins,
 however, he sits in the theater and he dreams a train is chasing
 him with "all the white people laughing as he ran screaming. . ."
 (125). At once the racial nightmare enters his real life-the man
 screams out loud, his seemingly unprovoked cries startle the
 people around him and announce his dislocation from "reality."
 At this point the narrative diagnoses the man insane. But if the
 King of Bingo is schizophrenic, he is a brilliant phenomenolo-
 gist. Conscious of the fine distinction between sanity and insan-
 ity, he is equally rational and insane. The man thinks to himself,
 "Ask somebody for something and they'd think you were crazy.
 Well, I ain't crazy. I'm just broke" (124). He knows he is not
 crazy; rather, the economic and racial caste lying beneath the
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 surface renders him desperate. The man who imagines himself
 King of Bingo "felt vaguely that his whole life was determined
 by the bingo wheel." His problem is material, a lack of mobility,
 so that in the randomness of the wheel "he felt a profound sense
 of promise, as though he were about to be repaid for all the
 things he'd suffered all his life." With that promise "he felt
 drunk." What the King of Bingo feels defines his consciousness,
 "there was still that feeling of helplessness within him" (129-30),
 and also his behavior, "They think I'm crazy. Well let 'em laugh.
 I'll do what I got to do" (134). The man is unable to let go of his
 ambition to win the lottery, and like the millions of Negroes in
 Ellison's America whose goal is complete recognition and full
 citizenship, the prize seems impossible.
 In the postwar era, African Americans expected "real" de-
 mocracy, and Cold War tensions required the US to reconsider
 its position on segregation. As Penny M. von Eschen recently
 argued in Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticoloni-
 alism, 1937-1957 (1997), the nation would have to eliminate
 state-sanctioned Jim Crow in order to justify its moral authority
 as an international power. But, despite legal movements toward
 integration, the social custom of segregation as racial hierarchy
 and racial distinction promised the "unreality" of legal equality.
 This conflict between the law and social custom presented a par-
 adox that black intellectuals sought to make clear. For writers
 like Wright and Ellison, the promise of integration-one that
 imagines social equality and the elimination of racial distinc-
 tion-requires a meaningful confrontation with difference. Inte-
 gration suggests assimilation, the notion that skin color can lose
 its invidiousness in the public sphere, that white and black are
 equal and, consequently, without any meaning that would articu-
 late social value. In their work that privileges psychological dis-
 courses, both writers seek a meaningful engagement with the im-
 position (and thus the "reality") of racial caste at a moment in
 American history that celebrates democracy yet denies human
 equality. Moreover, their aesthetic interest in a discursive psy-
 chology articulates a consciousness, both universally human and
 particularly individual, that rejects the long-standing "racial pro-
 tocol"-the notion that an African-American subjectivity is only
 exterior-while it advances the notion that, because of their con-
 sciousness, individual black people are universally human, not
 equally white. Although this claim seems obvious and perhaps
 even elementary, the lesson that because black people think, feel,
 and write they are both complex and human remains unlearned,
 an unlearning embodied for Wright and Ellison in segregation as
 law and racial hierarchy as social custom.
 [Ellison and Wright]
 seek a meaningful
 engagement with the
 imposition (and thus the
 "reality") of racial caste
 at a moment in American
 history that celebrates
 democracy yet denies
 human equality.
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 In order to explain the illogic of the paradox in which they
 live and work, both become what Ross Posnock calls "antirace
 race men." Ellison's and Wright's intellectual projects intersect in
 their rejection of simple, dualistic extremes. Their epistemology
 engages contradiction and posits the interplay of terms deemed
 mutually exclusive: black and white, the universal and the partic-
 ular, public and private, the political and the aesthetic. Their per-
 spective-one that depends on the language of psychology and
 the metaphor of schizophrenia-amounts to an assault on the
 cultural status quo. Posnock's discussion of black intellectuals
 argues that black Americans were "the first modern American
 intellectuals" since their work challenged "a dichotomized social
 configuration prevalent in the nineteenth century that kept mind
 and power, culture and politics, static and separate realms" (2,
 53). This challenge helped to create "the modern intellectual"
 and simultaneously the "political public sphere." To regard El-
 lison and Wright in this light is to recognize their work and the
 role of American literature as more than an aesthetic practice.
 Thus, as black men and as intellectuals, Ellison and Wright relish
 contradiction for it makes literal the tension between art and pol-
 itics. Because their work privileges interiority, it rejects the more
 general acceptance of racial exteriority. And, even as their writ-
 ing promotes social and political equality, it also deliberately
 seeks an aesthetic freedom that resists the imposition of racial
 authenticity, of "racial protocol." Consequently, their antirace
 race writing forces the confrontation with "reality" both men
 seek.
 While locked beneath a wall of glass at the Liberty Hospi-
 tal, Invisible Man is asked a telling question: "WHO WAS
 YOUR MOTHER?" The inquiry invokes long-standing proto-
 cols of identity by anchoring identity and behavior to blood.
 Both Freudian and racial, the question's intent seeks to fix the
 man within stereotype; the protagonist strategically eVades the
 imposition: "I looked at him, feeling a quick dislike and thinking,
 half in amusement, I don't play the dozens. And how's your old
 lady today?" (241). His response, first emotional, then intellec-
 tual, and finally ironic, defies reductive psychoanalytic and olit-
 ical analyses that would subjugate him to the single collec vity
 that is his race. Instead, the feelings that lead to an earnest nd
 frightening) contemplation of identity result in turning the m s-
 guided question of identity as familial descent onto the inquirer.
 The rhetorical question, "how's your old lady today" refuses the
 identitarian double standard that incarcerates black people in
 stereotype and in segregation. Here, it is not the protagonist's
 mother but his mind-his feelings and thoughts-that assumes
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 the primary, definitional position since his response is not spoken
 but contemplated, and since the site of the question and its cri-
 tique occurs within a psychiatric hospital. Charles Johnson has
 argued, "it is Mind (the subject pole of experience), not Mat-
 ter (the object pole), that gives the perceived world its poly-
 morphous character" (16). His point illuminates Invisible Man's
 subjectivity as well as Ellison's choice to develop a theory of ex-
 perience most overtly at narrative instances where reason and
 madness mingle. From this interstice emerges "the lunatic's fancy
 and the work of art," a powerful conception of reality in an "un-
 real" world. It raises the stakes concerning aesthetic questions of
 meaning and history so that both become unstable, subjective,
 and most importantly, contingent. Just as the "crazy" Vet advises
 him as they both travel north, "Be your own father young man"
 (156), Invisible Man ultimately discovers that his multiplicity, his
 identity-his cosmopolitanism-is his own making, a persona
 fashioned to survive the maddening contradiction of US society,
 "[t]he fact is you carry part of your sickness within you" (575).
 The recognition of that "sickness" ultimately reflects his commit-
 ment to paradoxical division as a healthy reality-"[H]umanity
 is won by continuing to play in face of certain defeat. Our fate
 is to become one, and yet many" (577)-and anticipates Gilles
 Deleuze and Felix Guattari's "schizoanalysis."8 Their schizoana-
 lytic imagines madness as a radical break from an incarcerating
 power; Invisible Man finds himself in a psychiatric hospital be-
 cause he defies authority and by the end of the novel he comes to
 believe his freedom and his humanity depends on that defiance.
 Indeed, Freud has been turned upside down. Ellison situates his
 nameless, faceless protagonist without a father or a mother but
 within the social world and within a democracy.
 Insisting on the primacy of inwardness in literary represen-
 tation, Ellison and Wright understood the symbolic capital of
 psychology in the sociopolitical realm. Both endorsed the extra-
 literary influence of existential philosophy and social psychology
 on democratic issues of equality and justice. And, although
 Wright had relocated to Paris before the Supreme Court's Brown
 v. Board of Education (1954) decision, he continued to serve as a
 board member of Lafargue. He and Ellison both understood ra-
 cial distinction as a lunatic obsession and they produced a body
 of work that would provide critical cultural resonance for the
 decisive psychological arguments that made segregation uncon-
 stitutional. Their friend Wertham had testified for the NAACP
 at the Delaware litigation that led to the Supreme Court rulings.
 In addition, the clinic was the site at which crucial studies of
 black and white children took place. On several occasions in
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 Harlem, Wertham and his colleagues examined a racially mixed
 group of children. Since other tests had been limited to Negroes,
 the Lafargue group held a special significance for the NAACP
 attorneys since Wertham's findings could comment on the im-
 pact of segregation on the more general population. He con-
 cluded that since the social conflict of Jim Crow affected every-
 one he examined, the children "try to get a correct image of
 human relationships but fail because in circumstances that af-
 fect their lives most vitally they have been given a distorted im-
 age" ("Psychological" 96).9 As antirace race men, Ellison and
 Wright-like Wertham-were careful to avoid talk of racial infe-
 riority because such rhetoric was easily turned to racist purposes.
 Like the legal activists fighting segregation, their emphasis on
 interiority sought to explode the encrusted assumptions compro-
 mising black subjectivity Their aim was to promote "real" de-
 mocracy by devaluing the prominence of visible and tangible
 manifestations of racial hierarchy. In their focus on what lies
 beneath the surface their work helped to discredit earlier social
 scientific claims of black racial and biological inferiority Like
 Wertham and psychologists Kenneth and Maime Clark, they un-
 derstood segregation and racial discrimination as part of the tyr-
 anny of the visible that damaged blacks and whites alike.'0
 The Clarks', Werthams', and others' characterizations of
 what Ellison called a "nation of ethical schizophrenics" highlight
 the critical emphasis on the insidious contradiction of segrega-
 tion and democracy, a perspective overruled, in effect, by the
 false notion of black pathology. The now well-known ruling in
 Brown about the "intangible considerations" of segregation mis-
 reads the ethical and political critique of democracy by excluding
 Wertham's earlier testimony. In addition to the well-documented
 "feelings" of segregated black children, Wertham found that in
 "the white children we found a subtle, though definite tendency
 to identify unconsciously with Negro children." Before the Dela-
 ware court Wertham stated that both black and white children
 suffered an "unsolveable emotional conflict" and that they inter-
 pret segregation "in one way and only one way-and that is they
 interpret it as punishment" (qtd. in Kluger 444).11 However, the
 Supreme Court later translated this psychological evidence as
 not only having an effect on "the importance of education to
 our democratic society" as it "is the very foundation of good
 citizenship," but also as a denial of Negro children's equal protec-
 tion guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In order to dis-
 credit the logic of "separate but equal" the Court would have to
 recognize inequality as a direct result of racial separation. It then
 concluded that for Negro children segregation "generate[s] a feel-
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 ing of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
 affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone"
 (Brown 691). Those feelings now perceived as a social scientific
 justification for black American inferiority were initially under-
 stood as a tactical articulation of the "intangible" evidence that
 would undermine segregationist claims of the tangible equality
 of separate facilities and curricula. In order to win public sup-
 port for the notion of integration as a bulwark against assaults
 on American democracy, the antisegregationist position de-
 pended on psychological language.
 Concerning the psychological resonance of the Court's de-
 cision, historian Daryl Michael Scott writes, "When it came to
 damage imagery, the radicals took their intellectual cue not from
 Fanon or Malcolm X but from Ralph Ellison, the novelist and
 proponent of a weak brand of pluralism," and from "Richard
 Wright, the inspiration of the postwar pathologist" (166-67). As
 Scott's work confirms, Ellison's and Wright's engagement with
 psychological discourses helped to facilitate one of the most sig-
 nificant transformations in twentieth-century US history. How-
 ever, he understands their narrative interests in interiority as an
 effort to manipulate the therapeutic sensibilities of whites and
 ultimately to earn their acceptance. Scott's criticism not only ig-
 nores the insistence of Ellison, Wright, and others that whites
 also suffered from the hazards of segregation, but also overlooks
 the schizophrenic metaphor that critically illuminates the lie of
 American democracy As early as 1935, legal activists seeking
 racial equality worked to discredit the Social Darwinist authority
 that validated racial hierarchy. The Crisis reported that success-
 ful litigation would have "to use every legitimate means ... to
 accomplish actual equality of educational opportunities" (qtd.
 in Baker 192). Only a paradigmatic shift in social scientific dis-
 courses could facilitate this change, so that 10 years before the
 Supreme Court decision and two years before Lafargue's open-
 ing, it is no surprise that one critic writes, "[M]odern psychologi-
 cal warfare is being waged on the American color front" (Mason
 13). The project of granting African Americans full subjectivity
 and legal equality would require a consideration of more than
 skin color, of what lies beneath the surface, of psychology. Rec-
 ognizing this historical turn toward psychology at the postwar
 moment, anthropologist Lee D. Baker offers an account of the
 ways in which social psychologists and social anthropologists in-
 fluenced by psychology assumed critical authority over biologists
 and cultural anthropologists. According to Baker, legal briefs ad-
 vocating integration employed psychiatrists and psychologists
 who were able to discredit an earlier social science and were able
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 "to testify that no scientific rationale existed to classify the races
 and that African Americans were not inferior to White Ameri-
 cans" (201). In effect, psychology would refute biological justifi-
 cations of white supremacy.
 Ellison's and Wright's risk of "staging a mental theater"
 contests the belief that psychological discourses concerning
 black racial interiority endorse pathology and inferiority and it
 extends Du Boisan, self-reflexive double consciousness (Spillers
 136). Their stress on psychological being affords self-perception
 within a moment when racist contradiction threatens to negate
 individual and collective black subjectivity and their narratives
 function to make the intangibles of contradiction visible. When
 the King of Bingo first recognizes that his life feels like a night-
 mare, when he experiences a discrepancy between what he sees
 and what actually exists, a "strange sensation played over his
 skin" (125). This tension between perception and reality mani-
 fests itself on the man's body. Similarly, upon realizing the hospi-
 tal is not actually concerned with his health, Invisible Man re-
 calls, "my skin itched all over" (231). In The Outsider, Damon
 declares, "the body reflects the soul" (9), a version of "mental
 theater" that achieves critical significance with the acknowledge-
 ment of the deliberate coincidence that he also has the "feeling
 as though something were creeping over his skin" (284, 122). In
 each instance, intangibles-feelings and perceptions-originate
 from within and then become projected externally. Concerning
 double consciousness Spillers writes, "It is not enough to be seen;
 one was called upon to decide what it meant" (143), and she
 advocates a psychoanalytic cultural analysis that explains "a sub-
 ject in discourse crossed by stigmata, or the nonfantastical mark-
 ings of history whose shorthand is 'race"' (142). Spillers's theory
 clarifies Ellison and Wright's underdiscussed and often ignored
 practice within what she calls the "psychoanalytic" (145). The
 metaphor of schizophrenia, for example, illustrates not how it
 looks but what it means to live as a contradiction, as both Negro
 and American. Literal characterizations of individual psycholog-
 ies deny the negation real-life racism manifests; it makes "no-
 where" visible by revealing what Posnock calls "The Unclassified
 Residuum," the "paradoxical absurdities" that constitute black
 existence (64). Thus, when critic Phillip Brian Harper cogently
 describes a failed instance of Lacanian "self-idealization" in
 which Invisible Man cannot see himself reflected in the mirror
 of Mr. Norton's car, the reader can turn to other narrative mo-
 ments that explain what that negation means and also how it
 feels. 12
 At the factory hospital, Invisible Man tries to discern his
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 location, the causes of his present condition and its significance.
 He knows he lies in a hospital "They would care for me. It
 was all geared toward the easing of pain" (233) but he soon
 discovers their interest depends on altering his perception and
 his behavior. "Our concept is Gestalt" (236) their shock ther-
 apy disregards the man's physical and existential anguish. The
 reader and the protagonist soon discover that Invisible Man's
 feelings and his response have no value in the "scientific" prac-
 tice that imagines a "cure" for his alienation. "I was pounded
 between crushing electrical pressures . .. each time my breath
 returned I yelled, punctuating the rhythmical action of the
 nodes." Like the hospital workers, the reader can see the protago-
 nist suffer. But for the hospital workers the man's condition re-
 mains in a single dimension; unlike the reader, they refuse to
 recognize "the lower frequencies" that articulate the "intan-
 gibles" that lend meaning to experience (581). Concerning his
 treatment, one of the hospital workers asks, "But what of his
 psychology?" and meets the response, "Absolutely of no impor-
 tance!" (236). Even as they attempt a "therapy" meant to realign
 Invisible Man's relation to social "reality," his feelings neither
 matter nor have influence. Their ignorance becomes apparent to
 the reader, who, because she has access to the man's psychology,
 has the ability not only to see the man's invisibility, but, as
 Harper and Spillers argue, to apprehend what it means.
 That denial of meaning takes on special significance at nar-
 rative moments when the tension between sanity and insanity is
 most vivid. At the psychiatric hospital, Invisible Man "discov-
 ered that I was not lying on an operating table but in a kind
 of glass and nickel box" (233), and he begins to understand his
 condition in terms of his location. Like the crowded, segregated
 Harlem Ellison describes in "Harlem Is Nowhere," the place In-
 visible Man finds himself is "cramped." Even as he registers a
 complaint concerning the discrete and stifling quarters in which
 he must meet his "treatment," the people who confine him ex-
 plain, "Don't worry about it, boy. You'll get used to it after a
 while" (235). Here, Ellison's narration begins to illustrate both
 sides of the paradox he and Wright seek to describe. The "real-
 ity" that Invisible Man (like Johnny Gibbs's mother) is locked in
 an asylum for no discernable reason contradicts the "reason"
 that lends authority to his "treatment." Beneath the glass the pa-
 tient looks insane, but because the reader approaches the story
 from the patient's interiority from his psychology she pierces
 the veil of appearances.
 For Ellison's protagonist, "Faces hovered above me like in-
 scrutable fish peering myopically through a glass aquarium wall."
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 From his view fragmented bodies, "first their heads, then the tips
 of their finlike fingers," present the reality of his present condi-
 tion as surreal. They look crazy, and in his dislocation, "A ter-
 rible sense of loneliness came over me." Invisibility becomes
 alienation and absurdity, "They appeared utterly stupid and I
 didn't like it. It wasn't right." The discontinuity Ellison describes
 here becomes multiple and vivid; and, as if in answer to Spillers's
 call, Invisible Man seeks to make sense of the scene: "But we
 are all human, I thought, wondering what I meant" (239). Split
 between thinking and meaning, Invisible Man cannot confirm
 his existence; his inability and effort to confirm this Cartesian
 syllogism not only drives the novel's plot but demands that he
 follow the "crazy" Vet's advice to "learn to look beneath the sur-
 face.... Even if it lands you in a straight jacket or a padded
 cell" (153).
 Like the electrified rug that shocks the protagonist during
 the Battle Royal, the "therapy" at the factory hospital rejects the
 possibility of Invisible Man's agency and humanity. This denial
 promotes an alternate reality that reveals a "schizophrenia" not
 in the black protagonist, but in the people and the society that
 abide strictly with an external view of black humanity. In an un-
 published draft of the hospital scene Ellison makes this fixation
 on the surface even more vivid, "But how, it suddenly occurred
 to me, could they learn so much about me . . . from the outside
 of the case?" ("Hospital" 269). In their effort to "cure" Invisible
 Man, the hospital workers ignore his interiority and fail to recog-
 nize his personhood. From beneath the glass the protagonist ob-
 serves their fantasy and takes a breath that becomes a burp and
 an "interruption to the smooth function of the machine." At this
 moment of resistance, "Hell broke loose" ("Hospital" 270); ini-
 tially the hospital workers cannot account for the disruption, but
 when a worker discovers the protagonist had burped, the inter-
 locutors are shocked. Ellison writes, "He, for a moment at least,
 was aware of a process originating within me. Thanks, human-
 ist." However banal, the burp demands an admission that the
 superficial examination and treatment denies. The burp and its
 observation become a forced exchange that suggests human pos-
 sibility; it causes the protagonist to reconsider the object of his
 "cure." Concerning the issue of his identity, Invisible Man real-
 izes "for all the questions they'd put to me, they had made no
 provision for hearing my answers! ... What was their game? Why
 ask questions that couldn't be answered through the glass? What
 did they expect?" ("Hospital" 271). In the novel Ellison suggests
 the answer: "A kind of combat" that links the meaning of his
 identity with the conflict that compromises his personhood and
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 with the contradiction that promises his freedom (242), "When I
 discover who I am, I'll be free" (243). And, like the burp that
 emerges from within, Invisible Man's self-understanding and au-
 tonomy will not be the product of external creation.
 "To live amidst others without an identity was intolerable.
 In a strict sense he was not really in the world; he was haunting
 it, pleading for entrance into life" (132). Wright declares this in
 The Outsider, confirming as well the exigency with which Ellison's
 protagonist seeks self-definition and authentic social exchange.
 Like Invisible Man, Wright's Cross Damon pursues an individual
 identity that would grant freedom and humanity. Because of
 their concern with questions of alienation, individuality, respon-
 sibility, and freedom, both novels have been associated with exis-
 tentialism more than with psychology. Indeed, by 1945 Ellison
 had introduced his friend to French existentialism. Both writers
 had read S0ren Kierkegaard, Jean-Paul Sartre, and others in an
 attempt to reconcile their aesthetic and political commitments;
 and, since Wright lived in Paris as The Outsider was written and
 published, the novel has been often dismissed as Wright's "philo-
 sophical roll in the hay." But, despite Wright's obvious and some-
 times awkward display of existentialist theory, his interest in exis-
 tentialism emerges from his prior commitment to psychology.
 Wright believed The Outsider was his first literary effort "pro-
 jected out of a heart preoccupied with no ideological burden
 save that of rendering an account of reality" (Fabre, "Richard
 Wright" 119). Similarly, when Ellison shares his interest in exis-
 tentialism with his friend he writes, "their psychological probing
 has produced a powerful art" (Letter to Richard Wright). Thus,
 The Outsider can be considered a psychological novel that ex-
 tends the existentialist concerns apparent in "The Man Who
 Lived Underground" (1941) and anticipates the psychoanalytic
 themes in Savage Holiday (1954) and The Long Dream (1959).
 Although Cross Damon is often regarded as a symbol of a prob-
 lematic Christian ethic and of Nietzschean demonism, Damon
 recalls significantly Johnny Gibbs's "demon preco." Both are psy-
 chological metaphors for a more general social condition. In the
 novel Damon's crimes are not evil but amoral, he "is the twenti-
 eth century writ small" (283). His story is not primarily racial;
 Wright declares that in The Outsider, "I was trying to grapple
 with the big problem-the problem and the meaning of Western
 civilization as a whole" (Smith 37). Like Invisible Man, his prob-
 lem is at once particular and universal. Psychology reveals this
 simultaneity, its paradox, and its larger implications.
 Even before Damon chooses to discard his identity and in-
 vent a new self, he cannot confirm the Cartesian bias toward
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 cognition at the expense of the body: "He was despairingly aware
 of his body as an alien and despised object over which he had no
 power, a burden that was always cheating him of the fruits of
 his thought" (13). Damon begins to experience the metaphorical
 schizophrenia that characterizes the moment, "his tensions be-
 gan to deform the look of the world" so that what he feels be-
 comes the "reality" that he sees (126). His subsequent conversa-
 tion with Ely Houston, another "outsider," thus turns toward
 psychology as the necessary site at which to discern the particu-
 lar meaning of being black in America as well as its universal
 implications: "Negroes, they are going to be both inside and out-
 side of our culture at the same time. Every emotional and cul-
 tural convulsion that ever shook the heart and soul of Western
 man will shake them ... Negroes ... will become psychological
 men, like the Jews.... They will not only be centers of knowing,
 so to speak.... The political, social, and psychological conse-
 quences of this will be enormous. . ." (129). Now, Wright's Negro
 has become more than America's metaphor. As a "psychologi-
 cal" man he represents possibility. His condition anticipates
 Wright's description of "a quarrel with the West" in White Man,
 Listen! Lectures in Europe, 1950-56 by suggesting the meaning
 and the consequences of a paradoxical alienation (3), of what he
 calls "the problem of distance, a psychological distance" (7). As
 outsiders, Damon and Houston, his disabled Jewish counterpart,
 literally embody the era's phenomenological transition-a tran-
 sition concerned with postwar humanist claims as well as one
 engaged deeply in fundamental questions about racism and colo-
 nialism.'3 The underground accident that eliminates the burden
 of his past promises freedom in the future. Although Damon
 cannot escape the pessimism within himself, his self-perception
 and even his amorality, "That a man who kills like that is a bleak
 and tragic man" (283), reflect a crisis in the more general hu-
 man condition.
 What distinguishes Ellison and Wright is the exigency with
 which they portray black racial interiority. By 1946 and the emer-
 gence of the Lafargue Clinic, Ellison and Wright describe the
 crucial American Dilemma as an ethical, intellectual, and psy-
 chological conflict that borders on insanity. In the words of the
 Vet, both Ellison and Wright "raise the ante" (153). The risk of
 promoting the notion that, indeed, black people were "crazy any-
 way" would increase the priority and the effort to resolve the
 hypocritical denial of universal humanity and democracy in the
 US by forcing a "shock" of "reality." Like the "objectivity" of
 psychiatric shock therapy, Ellison and Wright's engagement with
 psychology disturbs the madness that promotes inequality and
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 imagines it sane. As a metaphor, schizophrenia illustrates and
 defines this paradox while it rescues black people from the depths
 of segregation and pity
 Notes
 1. St. Phillip's Episcopal Church, 215 W. 133rd Street, New York City The
 clinic's success prompted development plans for a state-sponsored psychiatric
 clinic at Harlem Hospital, under the direction of Dr. Harold Ellis. See Lafargue
 Clinic Records. Concerning the plans for Harlem Hospital's Clinic, see Curtis.
 2. Born and trained in Germany, Wertham is best known for his arguments
 concerning the negative psychological influence of comic books on children
 that culminated in The Seduction of the Innocent (1954). As an expert witness
 for the defense at several criminal trials, he offered testimony concerning the
 psychoanalytic causes of certain types of violent behavior. When Lafargue
 opened, Wertham was also the director of the Mental Hygiene Clinic at Queens
 General Hospital, New York, and president of the Association for the Ad-
 vancement of Psychotherapy
 3. Wright and Wertham met and became friends in 1941. Both studied the
 details of the murder conviction of Clinton Brewer; and, while Wertham served
 as an expert witness for the man's second criminal trial, Wright used Brewer's
 story to outline the narrative that, inspired by Wertham's Dark Legend, A Study
 in Murder (1941), became Savage Holiday. Wertham also published a psycho-
 logical study of Wright's Native Son, "An Unconscious Determinant in Native
 Son" (1944). While working for the Merchant Marine Union in 1944, Ellison
 sought exemption from the draft and service in a segregated army Wright re-
 ferred him to his friend. Wertham for what he characterized as a "psychiatric
 out." See Wright's journal entry dated 22 January 1945. Ellison met and became
 friends with Wertham in 1944; the details of their meeting and subsequent
 friendship remain vague since Wertham's papers at the Library of Congress
 remain closed until 20 May 2002 and since a significant section of Ellison's
 papers, also at the Library of Congress, remain restricted. Forthcoming critical
 biographies on Ellison by Lawrence P. Jackson (Ralph Ellison. Emergence of
 Genius [2001]) and Rampersad should illuminate more of these details. Jack-
 son and Rampersad have generously shared their insights and their research
 with me.
 4. In addition to Myrdal's An American Dilemma, several postwar cultural
 critics identified the problem of segregation as one that affected the "hearts and
 minds" of all Americans. See also "Prejudice: Our Postwar Battle" (1945) and
 Harry S. Ashmore, Hearts and Minds. The Anatomy of Racism from Roosevelt
 to Reagan (1982), esp. 82-206. Articles on the Lafargue Clinic in mainstream
 magazines also understood that, with the promise of integration, the salient
 features of the social manifestations of racial difference were increasingly pri-
 vate and interior. See "Clinic for Sick Minds" (1948) and "Psychiatry in Har-
 lem" (1947). By the 1950s, psychology became one of the most popular means
 to discuss the "Negro Problem." See, e.g., Charles I. Glicksberg, "Psychoanaly-
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 sis and the Negro Problem" (1956), and Martin M. Grossack, "Psychological
 Research and the Negro" (1956).
 5. Many of Ellison and Wright's contemporaries wrote psychoanalytically en-
 gaged novels. Mary Jane Ward's The Snake Pit (1946) enjoyed heavy sales and,
 along with its film adaptation, helped increase the public visibility of mental
 hospitals. Jo Sinclair, author of Wasteland (1946) and The Changelings (1955),
 among others, also published an article celebrating the work at Lafargue. See
 Sinclair, "Authors Are Like People" (1946). Wertham served as a consultant
 for filmmaker Alfred Hitchcock; and the film Home of the Brave (1949) features
 an African-American soldier whose psychic trauma is not the violence of war,
 but the assault of racial discrimination. Ann Douglas recently described Ameri-
 can psychiatrists in the first two decades of the Cold War as hotly interested in
 "the psychopath," an admittedly imprecise term used to designate a person
 beyond the reach of social values, one who failed to internalize the norms of
 social behavior. She documents the popularity of Freudian psychoanalysis,
 Reinhold Niebuhr and Fyodor Dostoyevsky's novels as evidence of the era's
 interest in "self-scrutiny and the darkness such scrutiny reveals." She character-
 izes its discursive features as "a form of extreme displacement, language split
 off from visible reality." See Douglas, "Periodizing the American Century:
 Modernism, Postmodernism, and Colonialism in the Cold War Context"
 (1998). Janet Walker's Couching Resistance: Women, Film, and Psychoanalytic
 Psychiatry (1993), esp. 1-23, offers a detailed account of the tremendous rise
 of psychiatry, psychology, and social work in the postwar decades.
 6. The promise of integration had certainly influenced African-American in-
 tellectuals' sense of their future as writers. I discuss this critical turning point
 in my manuscript Post-Black: Race, Writing and Integration. In an issue of
 W E. B. Du Bois's journal Phylon, a group of black intellectuals were asked,
 "Would you agree with those who feel that the Negro writer, the Negro as sub-
 ject, and the Negro critic and scholar are moving toward an 'unlabeled' future
 in which they will be measured without regard to racial origin and condition-
 ing?" The question was meant to highlight the integrationist moment as well
 as the "universalist" trend. The responses describe a Jim Crow aesthetic in de-
 cline and anticipate an emerging "freedom" from its confines. See Hill and
 Holman.
 7. Fenichel's definition is especially revealing not only because it was under-
 stood as an authoritative reference source and was published as Wright and
 Ellison worked to establish Lafargue, but also because Wright owned the book.
 See also Michel Fabre, ed., Richard Wright: Books and Writers (1990).
 8. Notably, at the same moment prominent critic Lionel Trilling is also cele-
 brating the notion that intellectual maturity, or "reality," consists of the ability
 to hold contradictory ideas in tension rather than to commit to a single ideol-
 ogy See his chapter "Reality in America" in The Liberal Imagination, esp. 1-19.
 9. In 1951 specialists at the Lafargue Clinic examined 13 Delaware school
 children. Eight of the children were black Americans and five were white
 Americans; all were selected at random from four different locations within the
 state. Using individual case histories, individual interviews, group observation,
 group discussion, drawing tests, mosaic tests, and Rorschach tests, Wertham
 and his colleagues concluded that, since segregation is a "negative health fac-
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 tor," it was a general "public health problem." The examinations at the clinic
 were the first of their kind. See Wertham's "Psychological Effects of School
 Segregation" (1952) and "Psychiatric Observations on the Abolition of School
 Segregation" (1953).
 10. Kenneth Clark's "Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality
 Development" (1950) was the first psychological study listed in the decisive
 footnote in the Brown decision. The citation also included Max Deutscher and
 Isidor Chein, "The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey
 of Social Science Opinion" (1948) and Myrdal's An American Dilemma. It is
 important to note that the decision does not include the primary publication
 emerging from the Clarks' well-known "Dolls Test." See their "Racial Identifi-
 cation and Preference in Negro Children" (1947).
 11. On 23 October 1951, the New York Times reported Wertham's testimony
 that "an equally adverse effect was noted in the white children" (Dales). Wer-
 tham's testimony also appears in Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History
 of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality
 (1977).
 12. Harper's argument more specifically considers the question of African-
 American male subjectivity as "a function of the social interrelation of blacks
 and whites." His work also engages concerns about postmodernity and capital-
 ism; and it is especially resonant here since Jacques Lacan, like Wertham, was
 Ellison's contemporary. Using Lacan's psychoanalytic theory to explore the is-
 sue of individual black subjectivity, he emphasizes the multiplicity and contra-
 diction I discuss here. For Harper, the question of individual black subjectivity
 is "not so much as the negation conventionally believed to emblematize it but
 rather always as potentially unfulfilled, simultaneous promise and disappoint-
 ment" (116).
 13. By the 1950s Wright, more than Ellison, began to think of psychoanalysis
 as a means to articulate issues that extended beyond the US. His residency in
 Paris, his travels throughout Europe, Africa, and Asia as well as his friendships
 with Aime Cesaire, Simone de Beauvoir, Frantz Fanon, Jean-Paul Sartre, and
 Leopold Senghor helped to expand his interest in global concerns. In January
 1947, Wright helped Cesaire, Senghor, and Alioune Diop launch Presence Afri-
 caine. See also his Black Power (1954), The Color Curtain (1955) and Pagan
 Spain (1957). For a detailed treatment of Wright's transnationalism, see Man-
 thia Diawara 59-77 and Paul Gilroy 146-86.
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